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We construct a family of models to analyse the effect on optimal educational investment of (i) society’s preferences for equity and
(ii) competition between countries. The models provide insights about the impact of a variety of parameters on optimal policy. In
particular, we identify a form of “overeducation” that is new to the literature and provide a counterexample to a common finding
in the literature on fiscal federalism.
1. Introduction
Economists’ interest in education often focuses upon the rate
of return to schooling investments. Yet it is a characteristic of
the education system in many countries that, for the most
part, schooling is funded out of the public purse. While one
might imagine that governments should seek to “equalise
rates of return in all directions” [1], it is often the case that
the authorities have broader objectives that inform their
educational investments. For example, a government may
have preferences about equity as well as efficiency. Or it
may, for various reasons, be concerned to ensure that its
own investment in its people’s skills does not fall behind
investments made by other countries.
We examine these issues by developing, in the next sec-
tion, a series of models that can aid our understanding of
how, under a variety of conditions, the optimal provision of
publicly funded education is determined.
2. The Model
In this section we present a family of related models of
education and the tax system in order to provide insights
into how governments can reach decisions about the optimal
funding of education where (i) society has preferences about
equity and (ii) decisions have impacts across countries. The
basic structure of the model builds on the analysis of Johnes
[2].
2.1. Equity. Suppose that the disposable income of individ-
ual i is given by
Yi = (Y0 + sib)(1− τ), (1)
where Y0 is a basic income to be defined more precisely later,
si is a binary variable that indicates whether the ith individual
has undertaken schooling or not, τ is the proportional rate of
income tax, and b is the income premium associated with
schooling. Both Y0 and b are assumed exogenous. Tax
revenues are used solely for the purpose of financing edu-
cation which, we assume, takes place instantaneously. This
distinguishes the model from a family of models typified by
that of Bovenberg and Jacobs [3], where taxation also serves a
redistributive purpose. In our model we keep the tax system
simple in order to facilitate the extension to the international
case in Section 2.2 below. In the present model, tax revenues
fund education as a means of achieving the redistribution
of income, but they could equally fund any investment that
achieves this goal. Investments in health, for example, could
equally be modelled in this way. For simplicity we consider
only one public good.
Denote by λ the proportion of the population n that
undertakes education. Total tax revenue is given by
τn(Y0 + λb). (2)
Suppose that the cost of providing schooling to each indi-
vidual is an increasing function of λ, and is, more precisely,
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Table 1: Optimal rates of tax and education under various parameter assumptions in the model of income distribution.
σ = 0.5 σ = 0.75 σ = 0.9 σ = 1
τ∗ λ∗ τ∗ λ∗ τ∗ λ∗ τ∗ λ∗
b = 0.5
γ = 2 0.09 0.2237 0.14 0.2827 0.16 0.3035 0.17 0.3136
b = 0.2
γ = 3 0.03 0.1010 0.05 0.1308 0.07 0.1551 0.08 0.1660
Note. Throughout it is assumed that Y0 = 1.
given by γλ. The total cost of education is then γλ2n, and this
must equal the expression in (2) in order for the exchequer’s
books to balance. Solving for λ, which must lie within the









The sum of disposable incomes is given by














To close the model, we introduce a social welfare func-
tion, maximisation of which yields solutions for the optimal
tax rate and the optimal level of education. We begin with
a particularly simple variant of the model in which social
welfare equals
W = n(1− τ)(Y0 + λσb), (5)
and where 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1 represents a weight attached to the
premium earned by higher income (educated) individuals.
In this way, society expresses its preferences concerning the
income distribution.
Substituting from (3) into (5) yields












It is possible, though tedious, to derive an analytical solu-
tion for the problem of maximising (6) with respect to τ. We
denote this solution by τ∗ and note that routine substitution
of this into (3) yields the optimal level of education, λ∗.
Clearly
τ∗ = τ∗(b,Y0, γ, σ
)
,




Since the analytical solutions for τ∗ and λ∗ are cumber-
some and uninstructive, we proceed by way of numerical
examples. In Table 1, we show the values of τ∗ and λ∗ that
obtain for a variety of assumed values of σ . These are shown
for various values of b, Y0, and γ. In the upper panel, we have
b = 0.5, Y0 = 1, and γ = 2, while in the lower panel we
Table 2: Optimal rates of tax and education under various param-
eter assumptions in the international model.
Model τ∗ λ∗ W∗
























Notes. Throughout it is assumed that γ = 1, β = 2.5, θ = 0.5, and Y0 = 1.
The value of welfare is reported as a per capita measure.
have b = 0.2, Y0 = 1, and γ = 3. The lower panel therefore
represents a state in which returns to education are lower,
and costs of education are higher, than in the upper panel.
It is readily observed that investment in education and,
consequently, also tax rates are lower in the lower panel
than in the upper panel. This follows directly from the fact
that returns to education are lower in the lower panel—with
both the earnings premium to educated workers being lower
and the cost of education being higher. It is also clear that
investment in education, and tax rates, fall as society places
more weight on equity. This result would, of course, need
to be qualified in the case of a model where taxes also serve
a redistribution role. Raising educational investment offers
greater return in a society where the incomes of the educated
workers carry more weight.
2.2. International Issues. The second variant of the model
that we examine is chosen to provide insights into interna-
tional issues. In order to build in some interaction between
the two countries, we assume b a decreasing function of
global education levels. This is to reflect the labour market
impact on one country of the educational investments made
by another country, through changes, for example, in com-
parative advantage. Some references in the received literature
(e.g., [4]) suggest that, owing to complementarity effects, the
impact of education in one country on the rate of return
to education in another should be positive. Here we are
adopting the alternative view that rising skill levels in one
economy worsens the competitive position of workers in
another, following, for example, Freeman [5]. Our model
assumes no migration across countries. Hence assume that
b = δ(
β + λ1 + θλ2
) , (8)
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σ = 0.75 σ = 0.9 σ = 0.75 σ = 0.9 σ = 0.75 σ = 0.9










































Note. See notes to Table 2.
where λ1 and λ2, respectively, denote the proportion of the
population in each country that undertakes education, and
where β is a constant. For simplicity we assume that n, Y0,
and γ are identical across countries.











β + λ1 + θλ2
)
]
= γλ2j n, j = 1, 2; (10)









j = 1, 2, k = 1, 2, j /= k
(11)
to establish the levels of λ1 and λ2 as
λ∗j = λj
(
τ1, τ2, γ, θ,β, δ,Y0
)
, j = 1, 2. (12)
Equations (12) are analogous to (3) in the earlier model.
Define social welfare within each country, in analogous











⎦, j = 1, 2.
(13)
To keep matters simple, suppose σ = 1. The maximisa-
tion of Wj with respect to τj can proceed either with the
two countries competing with one another, following Nash
[6], or with them playing cooperatively. In neither case is
there a straightforward analytical solution, so we proceed by
way of example. Results are shown for a variety of parameter
assumptions in Table 2. By symmetry, each country has the
same optimal tax rate and education level as the other in both
the Nash and the cooperative case.
The results indicate that the Nash solution implies higher
tax and education levels than the cooperative solution. The
intuition behind this result is straightforward. Starting from
a cooperative position, each country, taking the other’s
behaviour as given, has an incentive to raise its own invest-
ment in education. Consequently, Nash behaviour leads to a
type of “overeducation” that is new to the literature. In
contrast with the overeducation identified by authors such as
Daly et al. [7] and Dolton and Vignoles [8], where some
graduates fail to find work commensurate with their quali-
fications, the overinvestment in education that we observe in
the present model represents a shortfall in welfare due to
competition between countries.
The results reported here provide a striking contrast to a
finding that is common in the fiscal federalism literature—
namely that competition between tax jurisdictions leads to
lower tax rates [9]. When, as in this model, the tax is spent
on activity that is welfare enhancing, competition can have
the opposite effect.
In the above analysis a positive value has been assumed
for θ. It is conceivable, however, that θ < 0, indicating com-
plementarity of human capital stocks across countries. This
could lead to undereducation as each country fails to take
into account the positive externalities associated with its
education investments.
2.3. Equity in the International Model. Extension of the
model of the previous section to include values of σ < 1 is
straightforward, requiring no change to (8) through (13),
and only a minor change in the programming. Results for a
variety of parameter assumptions appear in Table 3. These
results follow the patterns identified in the earlier sections of
the paper and hence do not require extensive discussion here.
As the returns to education, here measured by δ, increase,
so does the optimal level of educational investment in either
the Nash or the cooperative model, other things being equal.
Likewise as σ rises, indicating weaker preferences for equity,
so the optimal level of educational investment increases. It is
worth noting, moreover, that as σ rises, the gap between the
Nash and cooperative equilibria tends to widen.
3. Conclusion
The notion that competition between countries leads to the
setting of tax rates that differ from those that would obtain
in the absence of such competition is a familiar one. In this
paper, we have extended this to examine the international
competition in tax and government expenditure, where the
expenditure takes the form of educational investments that
4 ISRN Economics
in themselves yield gains in the form of enhanced income.We
have also examined the operation of the model in the context
of alternative societal preferences for equity.
The type of overeducation identified in this paper is new
to the literature, and it is not at all clear how extensive this
effect might be in practice, where not all of the restrictions of
the present theoretical model apply. An interesting avenue for
future research might therefore be to evaluate this effect. It is
suggested that multicountry computable general equilibrium
models could prove to be a useful tool in this endeavour.
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